Financial press and stock markets in times of crisis by CASARIN R. & SQUAZZONI F.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
           Roberto Casarin and  
          Flaminio Squazzoni 
 
 
                  Financial press and stock  
                  markets in times of crisis 
 
 
 
ISSN: 1827-3580 
No. 04/WP/2012 
 
 
      
W o r k i n g  P a p e r s   
D e p a r t me n t  o f  E c o n o m i c s   
C a ’  Fo s c a r i  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  V e n i c e   
N o .  0 4 / W P / 2 0 1 2  
ISSN 1827-3580 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Financial press and stock markets in times of crisis 
 
 
Roberto Casarin 
University Ca’ Foscari of Venice 
 
Flaminio Squazzoni 
University of Brescia 
 
 
17 May 2012 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between negative news in financial newspapers and 
stock markets in times of global crisis, such as the 2008/2009 period. We analysed one year of 
front page banner headlines of three financial newspapers, such as the Wall Street Journal, 
Financial Times, and Il Sole24ore and created an index of bad news at a daily base. We 
examined the influence of bad news both on market volatility and dynamic correlation of 
American, Britain and Italian stock markets to look at the impact of bad news on global 
investment strategies. Our results show that press and markets co-influenced each other in 
generating market volatility. The three newspapers showed significant differences in their 
stance on the crisis, with Financial Times more pessimistic. Our results also show that Wall 
Street Journal bad news had higher predictability value for the correlation between US and the 
foreign markets. This confirms the international influence of Wall Street Journal. 
 
Keywords 
2008/2009 financial crisis; financial press; bad news; market volatility; dynamic correlation; 
Wall Street Journal; pessimism 
 
JEL Codes 
G14, G15, C58 
 
 
 
Address for correspondence: 
Roberto Casarin 
Department of Economics 
Ca’ Foscari University of Venice 
Cannaregio 873, Fondamenta S.Giobbe 
30121 Venezia - Italy 
Phone: (++39) 041 2349149 
Fax: (++39) 041 2349210 
e-mail: r.casarin@unive.it  
This Working Paper is published under the auspices of the Department of Economics of the Ca’ Foscari University of Venice. Opinions 
expressed herein are those of the authors and not those of the Department. The Working Paper series is designed to divulge preliminary or 
incomplete work, circulated to favour discussion and comments. Citation of this paper should consider its provisional character. 
Financial press and stock markets
in times of crisis
Roberto Casarin† Flaminio Squazzoni‡
†University Ca’ Foscari of Venice
‡University of Brescia
May 16, 2012
Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between negative news in financial
newspapers and stock markets in times of global crisis, such as the
2008/2009 period. We analysed one year of front page banner headlines
of three financial newspapers, such as the Wall Street Journal, Financial
Times, and Il Sole24ore and created an index of bad news at a daily
base. We examined the influence of bad news both on market volatility
and dynamic correlation of American, Britain and Italian stock markets to
look at the impact of bad news on global investment strategies. Our results
show that press and markets co-influenced each other in generating market
volatility. The three newspapers showed significant differences in their
stance on the crisis, with Financial Times more pessimistic. Our results
also show that Wall Street Journal bad news had higher predictability
value for the correlation between US and the foreign markets. This
confirms the international influence of Wall Street Journal.
Keywords: 2008/2009 financial crisis; financial press; bad news; market
volatility; dynamic correlation; Wall Street Journal; pessimism.
1 Introduction
Global financial crises have always followed specific patterns, which historically
showed certain common properties (e.g., Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)). Among
¶Address: Departments of Economics, University Ca’ Foscari of Venice, San Giobbe 873/b,
30121 Venice, Italy. E-mail: r.casarin@unive.it
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these, there is the crucial role of financial press (e.g., Tickell (1995); Thrift
(2001); Clark et al. (2004); Suttles and Jacobs (2010)). From the bursting
of Tulip mania in 1637 in the Netherlands to the dot.com bubble in 2001 in
America, financial press has largely influenced the stock market, often amplifying
the animal spirits of investors (e.g., Pixley (2002); Shiller (2002)).
Recent psychological and sociological studies showed that market responses
to news can be asymmetric. Indeed, investors are more sensitive to negative news
especially when the market situation is dominated by uncertainty and predicting
future outcomes is difficult (e.g., Thaler (1993); Borges et al. (1999); Soroka
(2006)). This can be explained as the result of the ”framing effect”, according to
which investors react disproportionally to negative news especially if information
source is authoritative (e.g., Entman (1996); Kahneman and Tversky (2000);
Tan and Chua (2004)). While the importance of these psychological and
sociological aspects has been largely underestimated in economics (e.g., Shiller
(2005), Knorr Cetina and Preda (2005)), they have been recently investigated in
empirical finance (e.g., Antweiler and Frank (2004); Tetlock (2007); Engelberg
and Parsons (2011)).
These studies showed that investors are largely influenced by media, rumours
and gossip even in ’normal’ market periods, where there is no reason why
prices should not contain all the needed information (e.g., Antweiler and Frank
(2004); Schindler (2007)). Therefore, we should expect in times of crisis that not
only does investors’ overconfidence have a crucial effect in moulding the market
sentiment; it may even bring investors to overestimate the economic relevance
of non-strictly economic, general picture media information.
To look at this, we have investigated the relationship between negative news
in financial newspapers and volatility and correlation between stock markets
during the recent global financial crisis. We analysed one year of front page
banner headlines of three financial newspapers, such as the Wall Street Journal,
Financial Times, and Il Sole24ore and created an index of bad news per
newspaper at a daily base. Then, we studied the relationship between this
index and the closing values of three stock market indexes, such as DowJones,
FTSE and MIB.
Unlike previous studies in empirical finance, which looked at the impact of
media information on market volatility in ’normal’ market periods (e.g., Tetlock
(2007)), we focused here on a period of financial turmoil and looked more at the
impact of general picture information provided by financial press. While studies
on the impact of social media on stock markets have been recently carried out
that focused on similar periods of crisis (e.g.,Preis et al. (2010); Bollen et al.
(2011)), our idea was that, in a situation of financial turmoil, the authoritative
columns of certain influential financial newspapers could even have a stronger
impact on investors’ mood. We opted to look at the front page banner headlines
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as they are crucial to summarize the meaning, tone and importance of the news
but are not expected to contain true, precise and detailed information about
economic facts extremely relevant for investors, unlike specialized columns. This
is because: (i) headline information is too succinct and (ii) front page messages
heavily reflect specific information strategies of the newspapers, which are mainly
interested to impress and attract the reader. Furthermore, unlike Antweiler and
Frank (2004), we did not restrict our interest to financial news strictly speaking.
Unlike Barber and Loeffler (1993) and Tetlock (2007), we did not focus on precise
information concerned with specific stocks. Therefore, we looked at general
picture information, which reflects more interpretation than objective detail.
Finally, by comparing three newspapers and their respective stock markets, we
also wanted to measure differences in interpretation of this global crisis in the
financial press (e.g., Griffin et al. (2011)).
To our knowledge, this is the first contribution that extended the analysis
from the impact of financial press on market volatility to that on market
correlation. Combining these two aspects is essential to look at the impact
of bad news on global investment decisions from the point of view of risk and
risk diversification. This also was to provide a clearer outlook on the causal
interplay of press and market in generating global pessimism.
Our analysis was performed by estimating the volatility and correlation
dynamics based on generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity
(GARCH) models (see Engle (1982)) with dynamic conditional correlation
(Engle (2002)). Secondly, we estimated the dynamic relationship between
market volatility/correlation and bad news by using vector autoregressive models
(VAR). We also performed a Granger-causality test to verify whether bad
news time series had predictive value for market volatility/correlation (Granger
(1969)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sect. 2 illustrates the
background and our research hypotheses. Sect 3 presents our dataset and
illustrates the bad news index that we used to measure the relationship between
newspapers and markets. It also shows data on market volatility and correlation.
Sect 4 introduces our model that looked at the impact of newspapers on markets.
Sect 5 focuses on causal relationships between press and markets. Finally, Sect
6 summarizes our main findings.
2 Background and Hypotheses
Many studies showed that stock market prices incorporate financial press
information (e.g., Pearce and Roley (1985); Liu et al. (1990); Tivegna and Chiofi
(2004)). While this may be expected in case of quantitative information on
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important economic statistics, such as those regularly released by important
institutional agencies (e.g., Stickel and Verrecchia (1994); Balduzzi et al. (2001);
Kim and Sheen (2001); Pritamani and Singal (2001), Brenner et al. (2009);
Tetlock (2010, 2011)), it is less likely to find a positive impact of qualitative
information, such as journalists’ opinion or report of market rumors, which
is subjective (Coval and Shumway (2001); Schindler (2007)). Nevertheless,
empirical evidence is also growing on this.
For instance, Barber and Loeffler (1993) examined ”Dartboard”, a monthly
column of the Wall Street Journal reporting analysts’ recommendations, from
1988 to 1990. They found that for the two days following the publication,
average positive abnormal returns of 4 percent of the stock recommended were
documented that were partially reversed only within 25 trading days. Similarly,
Tetlock (2007) examined ”Abreast of the Market”, a popular column of the Wall
Street Journal, from 1984 to 1999. It is worth noting that, unlike ”Dartboard”,
which involved market analysts, this column should be viewed as closer to
entertainment than information. He found that even qualitative information,
such as the fraction of negative words in this column, was incorporated in
aggregate market valuations. More specifically, results showed that high level of
pessimism robustly predicted downward pressure on market prices and that high
or low values of pessimism helped to predict high market trading volumes. More
recently, Dougal et al. (2012) examined 30 years of ”Abreast of the Market” and
showed that even particular columnists can influence stock market behaviour.
Tetlock et al. (2008) extended this type of empirical analyses by addressing the
impact of negative words in all Wall Street Journal and Dow Jones News Service
stories about individual S&P 500 firms from 1980 to 2004. They found that
negative words in the financial press forecasted low firm earnings and that stock
market prices incorporated the information embedded in negative words only
with a slight delay.
Other studies showed that this effect was even true for unconventional, not
specialized media, whose information should be less relevant for investors. For
example, Antweiler and Frank (2004) examined the effect of more than 1.5
million messages posted on Yahoo! Finance and Raging Bull about 45 companies
in the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the Dow Jones Internet Index, by
measuring bullishness. They found that stock messages helped to predict market
volatility both at a daily base and also within the trading day. More specifically,
they found that higher message postings predicted negative subsequent returns.
They also found that disagreement between the posted messages was associated
with increased trading volume. More recently, Bollen et al. (2011) found that
Twitter mood predicted more than 80% of daily volatility of closing values of the
Dow Jones Industrial Average. This would confirm Nofsinger’s argument that
social mood may cause an increase of decisions biased by optimism or pessimism
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that can considerably influence aggregate investment and business activity, even
reflecting future economic activities (Nofsinger (2005)).
Our research hypotheses were as follows. First, Borges et al. (1999) and
Schindler (2007) showed that investors, even those following long-term strategies,
are more influenced by negative news as they reduce the difficulty in predicting
future outcomes by overestimating the impact of current information (see also
Soroka (2006). This was also found in experimental and economic psychology
(e.g., Shiller (2005)). Our hypothesis was that the importance of these
psychological bias could dramatically increase in periods of financial turmoil as
investors tend to disqualify the reliability of prices and even the well-functioning
of the market and are more sensitive to other sources of information, including
newspaper headlines, even if these sources should have questionable economic
value.
On the one hand, the fact that the information content is subject to strategies
of profit maximisation by newspapers should bring investors to cautiously
consider the objective information value of these sources (Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2010)). On the other hand, in a situation of radical uncertainty, it is reasonable
to expect that investors overestimate their informational gap and the potential
impact of a variety of news on the future outcomes of their investments.
Therefore, our first hypothesis (H1) was that bad news published by financial
newspapers could negatively influence the daily volatility of financial markets in
the period under observation.
Secondly, although most financial crises showed an international impact also
in the past, the 2008-2009 crisis had a truly global dimension as financial markets
are now extremely interdependent. Indeed, modern investment technologies
allow investors to execute millions of operations per time unit, every time and
everywhere (e.g., Ackerman (2008)). In this situation, we expect that pessimistic
messages of financial newspapers could explain not only market volatility but also
the dependence between stock markets. Numerous previous studies showed that
herd behaviour in financial markets tend to be highly correlated with periods of
volatility (e.g., Morris and Hyun (1999); Shiller (2005)). For instance, Mondria
(2006) suggested that in periods of crisis and high market volatility, covariation
could even include markets that do not have much in common. Our hypothesis
(H2) was that in periods of turmoil, bad news could even influence the correlation
of markets and had an impact on global investment strategies. Coherently with
this, we expected that in the period under observation the interplay of financial
markets and press could determine a cascade of pessimism that co-influenced
both information and market behaviour (H3) (e.g., Cipriani and Guarini (2008)).
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3 Data
3.1 The Bad News Index
Our dataset includes one year of front page banner headlines of three financial
newspapers, such as the Wall Street Journal, Financial Times and Il Sole24ore, at
a daily base. We analysed any front page banner headline from 1 September 2008
to 1 September 2009 that conveyed news on the crisis (not only those expressly
related to financial markets) by measuring the emphasis and the tone of the
message. The emphasis was measured by counting the number of banner columns
reporting an economic news compared with the total number of potentially
available columns, according to the standard newspaper layout. We assumed
that higher was the percentage of columns assigned to the banner headline, the
stronger the emphasis of the message was. The tone was measured by counting
the number of negative words on the total words used in the headline text (all
included, also verbs and junctions), such as ‘recession’, ‘fear’ and alike. We
assumed that the higher was the number of negative words in the text, the
stronger the pessimism of the message was. For the sake of simplicity, we did
not distinguish the degree of pessimism by raking the words used.
Our bad news index was based on three types of information. We considered
the number of negative banner headlines on the crisis, Lk,t, the number of
columns, Ck,t, used to report the news and the number of negative words reported
in the text, Nk,t, at time t for each journal k = F,W, S. The index was build
as follows. Let Tk,t be the maximum number of available columns for a banner
headline in the newspaper, then the relative importance index was
wk,t =
Ck,t
Lk,t
(1)
k = F,W, S and t = 1, . . . , T . Then the journal-specific bad news index, Bk,t, at
time t for the journal k, was defined as
Bk,t = wk,t(Tk,t(1 +Nk,t)) (2)
for k = F,W, S and t = 1, . . . , T .
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1 shows the bad new index distinguished for newspaper. The vertical
dashed lines corresponded to certain peaks of bad news. A first peak was on
16 September 2008, as the day before it was announced that Lehman Brothers
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, Merrill Lynch agreed to be sold to
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Bank of America for 50 billion dollars and estimates said that up to 50.000 jobs
were at risk in banks’ collapse. A second peak was on 24 October 2008 after the
Congressional hearing where Alan Greenspan admitted that he put too much
faith in the self-correcting power of markets. A third peak was on 6 April 2009,
involving especially Financial Times, when the Geithner plan to buy toxic assets
was strongly criticised as a means to provide government ”cash for trash” and
UK analysts started to forecast that stagflation was around the corner.
Looking at the bad news dynamics, it is possible to observe that our one-
year sample could be approximately divided in two sub-samples, i.e., a first
period characterized by higher concentration of bad news and a second one,
after spring 2009, where bad news were generally less frequent. By comparing
the three newspapers, it is evident that Wall Street Journal was more cautious
and Financial Times published bad news more frequently also in the second
sub-sample.
Tab. 1 shows mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis of the bad
news index per newspaper. Looking at the mean value of the bad index, it
is worth noting that Financial Times was more pessimistic than the other
newspapers. On the other hand, if we consider the deviation from the mean
(skewness) and the extreme values (kurtosis), Il Sole24Ore showed higher excess
of pessimism. Wall Street Journal was more cautious throughout the entire
sample, i.e., it showed both lower mean and volatility.
To look in more detail at data, we have distinguished two sub-samples, the
first from 1 September 2008 to 30 March 2009, where the market volatility was
considerably higher, the second from 31 March 2009 to 1 September 2009, with
less volatility. Data showed that pessimism was generally higher in the first
sub-sample. Financial Times and Wall Street Journal showed a similar level
of excess of pessimism, which was lower than Il Sole24Ore. In the second sub-
sample, where market volatility was lower, Financial Times showed both higher
level of pessimism and excess of pessimism. Therefore, Financial Times followed
a more critical stance on the crisis, by reporting bad news even in period of
relatively lower market volatility.
Our database also included names and number of journalists who authored
any front page leading article on the crisis. Results showed that Financial Times
assigned these important articles to a few journalists. We calculated a Gini index
that measured the concentration of number of articles per journalist. Not only
did Financial Times concentrate more articles on a few journalists (WSJ index
took 0.61, while FT took 0.66); it did so especially in the low market volatility
period (WSJ index for the second sub-sample took 0.68, while FT took 0.77).
This means that the stronger critical stance of Financial Times in times of lower
market volatility was due to a few pessimistic journalists.
These findings can be explained considering certain differences between U.S.
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and UK financial press (e.g., Parsons (1989)). Schifferes (2011) argued that
higher pessimism of Financial Times in reflecting the 2008/2009 crisis should
be understood as a mixture of history and contingency (see also Tambini
(2010)). On the one hand, while Wall Street Journal has been historically more
devoted to investigation, addressed to an investor readership and focused on
domestic affairs, Financial Times has been influenced by economic theory and
interpretation and mainly focused on international affairs. This could explain the
stronger sensitivity of the Britain newspaper towards a general picture outlook
on the crisis (e.g., the implications of the financial crisis for the real economy)
and its stronger focus on commentaries and academic debate. Even the tendency
to blame on U.S. market responsibility and critically discuss the U.S. political
agenda against the crisis could explain the stronger sensitivity of Financial Times
towards the development of the crisis (see also Doyle (2006)). This would explain
why the crisis and its broader implications were covered more extensively by
Financial Times. In general, from our database on press coverage of the crisis,
more than 80% of Financial Times front pages in the period considered included
an article or commentary on the crisis, against 67% of Wall Street Journal.
On the other hand, the stronger concern for home investors could have
brought Wall Street Journal to follow a less critical stance and be more cautious
in spreading bad news. In a recent story on the U.S. press coverage of the
financial crisis, Goodman (2011) suggested that American journalists were
extremely cautious in reporting bad news as it was clear that, in a situation of
market unpredictability and turmoil, any influential opinion or streamer could
have had a dramatic influence.
Secondly, after the dramatic events of September/October 2008, financial
press in UK was strongly criticized for ’boosterism’ and excessive embeddedness.
Schifferes (2011) explained that in the autumn of 2008, a turning point was
achieved in the relationship between press and markets, epitomized especially
by Financial Times. He called this ”media’s moral compass”, in that this
relationship transformed from a ”cozy co-dependence” to a more critical stance.
This would explain why Financial Times suggested a pessimistic interpretation
to economic events even in period of low market volatility, such as after March
2009.
Then, we calculated the correlation between newspapers (see Tab. 1).
Results showed that pessimism of newspapers was significantly positively
correlated. The more positive correlations were between Wall Street Journal
and Financial Times, and between Wall Street Journal and Il Sole24ore. If we
consider the difference between periods of high and low market volatility, it
is worth noting that the higher correlation was between Wall Street Journal
and Financial Times in period of high volatility, whereas correlations were
not-significant or negative in periods of low volatility. This means that in
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Whole Sample First Sub-Sample Second Sub-Sample
Mean St.D. Sk. Kurt. Mean St.D. Sk. Kurt. Mean St.D. Sk. Kurt.
W 0.82 1.07 1.69 6.41 1.09 1.22 1.30 4.74 0.42 0.61 1.47 4.64
F 1.98 2.49 2.73 15.86 2.38 2.22 1.10 3.67 1.40 2.78 4.39 26.79
S 1.17 2.31 4.12 27.41 1.60 2.76 3.56 20.33 0.55 1.19 2.84 11.85
Whole Sample First Sub-Sample Second Sub-Sample
W F S W F S W F S
W 1.00∗ 0.19∗ 0.13∗ 1.00∗ 0.20∗ 0.08 1.00∗ 0.03 -0.06
F 1.00∗ 0.11∗ 1.00∗ 0.06 1.00∗ 0.13
S 1.00∗ 1.00∗ 1.00∗
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the bad news index. First panel: mean,
standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis. Second panel: correlation between
indexes. The symbol ”*” indicates that the null hypothesis of zero valued
Pearson’s correlation was rejected at the 5% significance level.
periods of higher market volatility, differences between Wall Street Journal
and Financial Times drastically diminished. Indeed, in this period, these two
leading newspapers basically conformed both in terms of timing and intensity of
pessimism. On the other hand, significant differences persisted for other periods,
where market volatility was less considerable.
3.3 Market Volatility and Correlation
LetXi,t indicate the log-return at time t for FTSE (i = UK), DowJones (i = US)
and MIB (i = IT ) and calculate the volatility and correlation dynamics following
a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH ) model (see
Engle (1982); Engle and Ng (1993)) with dynamic conditional correlation (see
also Engle (2002)). For the sake of simplicity, we followed a non-parametric
approach to estimate the volatility and correlation dynamics as follows:
Si,t =
1− λ
1− λτ
τ−1∑
k=0
λk(Xi,t−k − X¯i,t)
2 (3)
Sij,t =
1− λ
1− λτ
τ−1∑
k=0
λk(Xi,t−k − X¯i,t)(Xj,t−k − X¯j,t) (4)
Rij,t =
Sij,t√
Si,t
√
Sj,t
(5)
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Figure 1: Bad news index per newspaper (in rows) from 01/09/2008 to
01/09/2009 at a daily base.
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for i, j = US, UK, IT where X¯i,t was the empirical average over
Xi,t−τ+1, . . . , Xi,t, λ > 0 was a smoothing factor and τ > 0 was a forgetting
factor. These measures should be seen as an approximation of the results
obtained with a GARCH model with dynamic correlation.
Fig. 2 shows the results of our non-parametric estimation procedure. The
first row shows the log-returns of the FTSE, DowJones and MIB market indexes
at a daily base for closing values. The graphs in the second row show the level
of log-volatility (i.e. log Si,t) for each index. Although we did not report data
before 1 September 2008, it is worth noting that market volatility significantly
increased after September 2008. This is evident when looking at the beginning
of our sample (see the graphs in the second row of Fig. 2). It is worth clarifying
that this was not due to a lack of data in the estimates at the beginning of the
sample. Indeed, the first estimate of the volatility was calculated starting from
a window of 60 initial observations, which were not represented in the first row
of Fig. 2. This means that our sample truly reflected a period of significant
market turmoil.
Results showed that market dynamics were similar. More specifically, while
the level of volatility was similar at the beginning, at the end of the sample the
Italian market showed higher log-volatility than the UK and U.S. stock markets.
Furthermore, the level of correlation between the three market indexes increased
after September 2008 and rapidly reached the level of 0.6 for DowJones and
FTSE, 0.7 for MIB and DowJones and 0.9 for MIB and FTSE. Secondly, our
results showed that the correlation between these three markets was positive. If
we look at values before and after the beginning of the period under observation,
it is worth noting that UK and Italian markets were more highly dependent than
the U.S. and UK and U.S. and Italy respectively.
These results confirm certain previous empirical findings on the higher
correlation between markets in period of financial crises (e.g., Forbes and
Rigobon (2002); Chiang et al. (2007)), especially in periods of higher volatility
of the U.S. stock markets (Longin and Solnik (2001)). Secondly, they would
confirm recent evidence on the increasing interdependence of European stock
markets ((Jondeau and Rockinger (2006)).
4 Model
Let Vt = (log SUS,t, log SUK,t, logSIT,t)
′ be the vector of log-volatilities and
Zt = (ϕ(SUS,UK,t), ϕ(SUS,IT,t), ϕ(SUK,IT,t))
′, with ϕ(x) = log(1−x)− log(1+ x),
the vector of logistic-transformed correlations. Let us define Mt = (V
′
t , Z
′
t)
′. We
examined the relationship between bad news and the variance and correlation
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Figure 2: Daily log-returns (first row) of the FTSE, DowJones and MIB
indexes from 01/09/2008 to 01/09/2009. Daily log-volatilities (second row) and
correlations (third row), evaluated sequentially over time with a rolling window
of τ = 60 observations and a smoothing factor λ = 0.99. In the last row, the red
lines indicate the 95% confidence band about the estimated correlations.
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of the three financial indexes. We considered the static models as follows:
Mi,t = νi + ψi,FBF,t + ψi,WBW,t + ψi,SBS,t + εi,t (6)
with i = 1, . . . , 6, and εi,t ∼ N (0, ξ
2
i ) i.i.d. ∀t, i.
Table 2 shows that all bad news coefficients were positive. This means the any
increase of pessimism by newspapers had a positive impact on the volatility of
markets. Obviously, the impact was not the same for all newspapers and markets.
Wall Street Journal had a strong impact on all markets considered. The bad
news of Wall Street Journal and Financial Times had a significant impact (at
the 5% significance level) on the contemporaneous level of log-volatility in all
markets (see the left panel in Tab. 2). Finally, Il Sole24Ore bad news affected
the volatility of the UK and Italian stock markets.
As regards to market correlation, it is worth noting that Wall Street Journal’s
pessimism had a significant impact on all market correlations. Vice-versa,
Financial Times and Il Sole24Ore affected only the behaviour of their respective
markets (see the right panel of Tab. 2). This would confirm the leadership of
Wall Street Journal in influencing the stock market and its worldwide impact.
On the other hand, it is interesting to note that any increase of pessimism by
Wall Street Journal had a negative impact on the correlation between UK and
Italian markets. This could be explained by the fact that Wall Street Journal
was mainly focused on domestic affairs and negative news on the U.S. stock
market could have brought investors to move their investments towards other
markets or in general to explore a variety of investment strategies, which could
have contributed to generate heterogeneity in stock market behaviour.
5 Causal Relations
To look at causal relationships in more detail, we performed a Granger-causality
test that examined the lagged dependence structure between bad news and
market correlation and volatility. This allowed us to verify whether bad news
time series had predictive value for market volatility and correlation. We
considered all possible dependences between markets and information, by setting
Bt = (BF,t, BW,t, BS,t) and considering VAR models.
13
Impact on volatilities
θ θˆ t-stat p-val
US
ν1 -7.6856 -192.1191 0.0000 *
ψ1,W 0.1332 4.6755 0.0001 *
ψ1,F 0.0266 2.8681 0.0044 *
ψ1,S 0.0354 2.8001 0.0551
UK
ν2 -7.7634 -202.5992 0.0000 *
ψ2,W 0.1198 5.0512 0.0001 *
ψ2,F 0.0323 3.1772 0.0017 *
ψ2,S 0.0395 3.2643 0.0012 *
IT
ν3 -7.4971 -236.6942 0.0000 *
ψ3,W 0.0731 3.7321 0.0002 *
ψ3,F 0.0234 2.7753 0.0059 *
ψ3,S 0.0301 2.9962 0.0031 *
Impact on correlations
θ θˆ t-stat p-val
US-IT
ν4 0.5818 39.6552 0.0000 *
ψ4,W -0.0161 -1.7674 0.0119 *
ψ4,F -0.0011 -0.2851 0.7762
ψ4,S -0.0028 -0.5983 0.5502
UK-IT
ν5 0.8334 122.7822 0.0000
ψ5,W 0.0108 2.5831 0.0104 *
ψ5,F 0.0037 2.0676 0.0398 *
ψ5,S 0.0048 2.0397 0.0225 *
UK-US
ν6 0.5862 38.0473 0.0000 *
ψ6,W -0.0206 -2.1631 0.0212 *
ψ6,F 0.0021 0.5152 0.6068
ψ6,S -0.0020 -0.4141 0.6790
Table 2: Left: the effect of the bad news indexes on volatility. Right: the
effect of the bad news indexes on correlations. Columns: the parameter θ (first),
estimates θˆ (second), value of the t-statistics (third), p-value of the t-statistics
(fourth) and ”*‘ indicates significance of the parameter at the 5% significance
level (last).
5.1 Volatility
A joint test on the causal relationships for the volatility and the pessimism was
based on the following VAR model of dimension 6 and order p:
Vt = Ψ10 +
p∑
j=1
(Ψ11,jVt−j +Ψ12,jBt−j) + ε1,t (7)
Bt = Ψ20 +
p∑
j=1
(Ψ21,jVt−j +Ψ22,jBt−j) + ε2,t (8)
with (ε1,t, ε2,t) ∼ N6(O6,Ξ) i.i.d. ∀t, Ψ
′
10 = (ψUS, ψUK , ψIT ) and Ψ
′
20 =
(ψF , ψW , ψS) were the intercept and the 3-dimensional square matrices Ψ11,j ,
Ψ12,j , Ψ21,j, Ψ22,j, were the autoregressive coefficients of the VAR6(p) model.
In order to disentangle the relationship between volatility and press, we first
looked at the statistical significance of the relationship between volatility at time
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t and news at time t − k, which depended on the matrices Ψ12,k, k = 1, . . . , p
with elements ψ12,kij , i = US, UK, IT and j = F,W, S. Then, we looked at
the relationship between bad news at time t and volatility at time t− k, which
depended on elements ψ12,kij , i = F,W, S and j = US, UK, IT of the matrices
Ψ21,k, k = 1, . . . , p. For our purpose and for the sake of simplification, we have
included only a subset of the VAR coefficients, i.e., the elements of Ψ12,1 and
Ψ21,1 only for the first lag (see Table 3).
Results showed that Wall Street Journal bad news (lagged by one period)
significantly increased the volatility of the three market indexes in the subsequent
period of time (see the left panel in Tab. 3). This is a further confirmation of
the leadership of this newspaper and its worldwide impact. The bad news of
other newspapers did not have a significant impact on market volatility, with
the exception of the lagged relationship between Il Sole24Ore bad news and
the volatility of the U.S. market. Considering the effect of market volatility on
bad news, it is worth noting that FTSE volatility had a significant and positive
impact on the bad news of each newspaper (see the right panel in Tab. 3). This
would confirm the recent worldwide importance of the London stock market.
Finally, it is worth noting that the volatility of the Dow Jones index had a
significant and negative impact on Il Sole24ore bad news.
We tested the hypothesis that volatility did not jointly cause, in the Granger
sense, the bad-news indexes. To look at the causal relationship between each
market-specific volatility and the three newspapers, we also tested separately
the hypothesis that neither each one of the three bad-news indexes, nor all
three indexes jointly considered caused, in the Granger sense, the market-specific
volatility. To look at the causal relationship between each newspaper and the
three markets, we tested the hypothesis that neither each one of the three log-
volatility variables, nor all three log-volatilities caused, in the Granger sense, the
newspaper bad news.
Tab. 4 shows the results of these joint and pairwise tests. First, if we look
at the p-value of the joint test in the last column and last row, in the left panel,
it is possible to observe that newspaper bad news were fully caused by market
turmoil. Therefore, stock market behaviour was the essential source of bad news
and newspapers did not provide unrealistically pessimistic stances. Secondly,
if we look at the p-value of almost all of pairwise causality tests (see the left
panel), this causality direction from markets to newspapers was true for all log-
volatility and bad news indexes. On the other hand, if we look at the p-values in
the last column, last row in the right panel, we should conclude that, in general,
the financial press did not cause market volatility. On the one hand, looking in
more detail, it is possible to observe that market volatility was unequivocally
caused by Wall Street Journal bad news alone (see the first row in the right
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Impact on volatilities
θ Ψˆ12,1 t-stat p-val
US
ψ
12,1
US,W 0.0093 3.1230 0.0020 *
ψ
12,1
US,F 0.0002 0.1692 0.8663
ψ
12,1
US,S -0.0033 -2.3871 0.0177 *
UK
ψ
12,1
UK,W 0.0076 2.2512 0.0253 *
ψ
12,1
UK,F 0.0002 0.1679 0.8676
ψ
12,1
UK,S -0.0019 -1.1534 0.2501
IT
ψ
12,1
IT,W 0.0073 2.1151 0.0354 *
ψ
12,1
IT,F 0.0004 0.3061 0.7602
ψ
12,1
IT,S -0.0023 -1.455 0 0.1469
Impact on newspapers
θ Ψˆ21,1 t-stat p-val
W
ψ
21,1
W,US -0.32445 -0.4851 0.6278
ψ
21,1
W,UK 1.70194 2.4692 0.0142 *
ψ
21,1
W,IT -0.96905 -1.8552 0.0648
F
ψ
21,1
F,US -2.0504 -1.2334 0.2188
ψ
21,1
F,UK 3.56990 2.0822 0.0384 *
ψ
21,1
F,IT 0.00951 0.0072 0.9941
S
ψ
21,1
S,US,1 -2.9694 -2.1252 0.03462 *
ψ
21,1
S,UK 4.58829 3.1842 0.00164 *
ψ
21,1
S,IT 0.2066 0.1892 0.8501
Table 3: Left: the effect of the bad news indexes at the first lag on volatility.
Right: the effect of volatility at the first lag on the bad new indexes. Columns:
the parameter θ (first), estimates θˆ (second), value of the t-statistics (third), p-
value of the t-statistics (fourth) and ”*‘ indicates significance of the parameter
at the 5% significance level (last).
panel). On the other hand, it is possible to argue that in general, we could not
predict market volatility looking at information in the financial press.
5.2 Correlations
The VAR model of order q for bad-news indexes and correlations was as follows:
Ct = Φ10 +
q∑
j=1
(Φ11,jCt−j + Φ12,jBt−j) + η1,t (9)
Bt = Φ20 +
q∑
j=1
(Φ21,jCt−j + Φ22,jBt−j) + η2,t (10)
with (η1,t, η2,t) ∼ N6(O6,Σ) i.i.d. ∀t, where Φ10 = (φUS, φUK, φIT ) and
Φ20 = (φF , φW , φS) were the intercept and Φij,k, i, j = 1, 2 k = 1, . . . , q, were the
autoregressive coefficients of the V AR6(1) model.
We examined the statistical significance of the relationship between
correlation at time t and bad news at time t− 1, which was given by the matrix
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H0: V 9 B H0: B 9 V
US UK IT All US UK IT All
W 0.0012* 0.0036* 0.0426 0.0011* 0.0000* 0.0248* 0.0086* 0.0100*
F 0.0042* 0.0000* 0.0010* 0.0024* 0.1289 0.9817 0.8260 0.7534
S 0.0009* 0.0001* 0.0008* 0.0010* 0.4934 0.7773 0.8918 0.7251
All 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.7442 0.7573 0.7536 0.2550
Table 4: Pairwise and joint causality test p-values. The null hypotheses (H0)
were as follows: volatility (V) did not cause (in the Granger sense) financial
press pessimism (B) (V 9 B, left panel), financial press did not cause volatility
(B 9 V , right panel). ”All‘ indicates all variables included in the test and ”*‘
indicates that the null is rejected at the 5% significance level.
Φ12,k with elements φ
12,k
ij , i = US − UK,US − IT, UK − IT and j = F,W, S.
Then, we also looked at the relationship between bad news at time t and
correlation at time t − 1, which was given by the elements φ21,kij , i = F,W, S
and j = US − UK,US − IT, UK − IT of the matrix Φ21,k.
For the shortage of space, Table 5 included only the autoregressive coefficients
at the first lag, not all the estimated coefficients of the VAR models. Our results
(see Table 5, left column) showed that Wall Street Journal bad news (one lag)
had a negative impact on the correlation between U.S. and UK stock markets.
Indeed, a bad news on the Wall Street Journal, which is usually more focused
on the U.S. economy, reduced the co-movement of these markets. This could be
explained in terms of outflow of capital from the U.S. stock market and inflow
in the UK market. On the other hand, Financial Times bad news (one lag) had
no significant impact on market correlations. Il Sole24ore bad news decreased
the correlation between the U.S. and Italian stock markets. Our explanation is
the same as before.
Furthermore, results (see Table 5, right column) showed that Wall Street
Journal bad news reflected all one lag correlations. An increase in the
correlation between the U.S. and UK stock markets decreased the journal
pessimism, whereas an increase in the U.S.-IT and UK-IT correlations increased
it. Furthermore, higher (one lag) correlation between the UK and Italian stock
markets increased the pessimism of Financial Times. Finally, all correlations
had a significant impact on Il Sole24Ore, similarly to Wall Street Journal.
In order to rigorously asses the presence of causal relationships, we performed
a joint and pairwise Granger causality test as we did for the log-volatilities. Tab.
6 shows the results. If we look at the last column, last row in the left panel, it
is possible to observe that all correlations had a Granger causal effect on all bad
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Impact on correlations
θ Φˆ12,1 t-stat p-val
US-UK
φ
12,1
US−UK,W -0.0023 -2.3541 0.0193 *
φ
12,1
US−UK,F 0.0004 0.4882 0.6263
φ
12,1
US−UK,S 0.0016 0.7422 0.4589
US-IT
φ
12,1
US−IT,W 0.0005 0.2482 0.8044
φ
12,1
US−IT,F -0.0003 -0.2901 0.7718
φ
12,1
US−IT,S -0.0029 -2.7522 0.0064 *
UK-IT
φ
12,1
UK−IT,W 0.0001 0.1411 0.8881
φ
12,1
UK−IT,F 0.0004 1.1182 0.2646
φ
12,1
UK−IT,S -0.0005 -1.1302 0.2598
Impact on newspaper
θ Φˆ21,1 t-stat p-val
W
φ
21,1
W,US−UK -4.6537 -3.5851 0.0004 *
φ
21,1
W,US−IT 3.4669 2.8091 0.0053 *
φ
21,1
W,UK−IT 5.9194 4.0342 0.0000 *
F
φ
21,1
F,US−UK -2.3772 -0.7242 0.4700
φ
21,1
F,US−IT 1.6567 0.5301 0.5962
φ
21,1
F,UK−IT 7.4877 2.0162 0.0449 *
S
φ
21,1
S,US−UK -8.0680 -2.9283 0.0037 *
φ
21,1
S,US−IT 5.1940 1.9836 0.0485 *
φ
21,1
S,UK−IT 12.8542 4.1272 0.0000 *
Table 5: Left: the effect of the bad news indexes at the first lag on market
correlations. Right: the effect of market correlations at the first lag on the bad
new indexes. Columns: the parameter θ (first), estimates θˆ (second), value of
the t-statistics (third), p-value of the t-statistics (fourth) and ”*‘ indicates the
significance of the parameter at the 5% significance level (last).
news indexes. More specifically, while U.S.-IT stock market correlation did not
cause the bad news index, UK-IT and U.S.-UK correlations had a Granger causal
effect on the bad news indexes of Financial Times and Il Sole24ore. Secondly,
looking at the last column, last row of the right panel, it is possible to observe
that the joint test did not reject the null hypothesis of absence of Granger
causality between all bad news indexes and all correlation indexes. Finally,
results showed that Wall Street Journal bad news determined U.S.-IT and U.S.-
UK market correlation but not that of UK-IT.
Therefore, any bad news onWall Street Journal predicted correlation between
the U.S. and the other stock markets. Following certain peculiarities of Wall
Street Journal as discussed in Sect 3 (see Table 2), such as its worldwide
recognized leadership and strong focus on domestic affairs, this means that
investors considered any bad news published on this influential newspaper as
a good prediction of market behaviour and promptly reacted by drastically
modifying their global investment strategies.
In conclusion, returning to our hypotheses formulated at the end of Sect
2, results corroborated our first hypothesis (H1), which argued that bad news
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H0: C 9 B H0: B 9 C
US-IT UK-IT US-UK All US-IT UK-IT US-UK All
W 0.1017 0.0295* 0.0595 0.0001* 0.0121* 0.6951 0.0451* 0.0221*
F 0.6570 0.0100* 0.0108* 0.0223* 0.4739 0.3627 0.3627 0.6034
S 0.1026 0.0029* 0.0029* 0.0001* 0.9723 0.8733 0.8733 0.4141
All 0.1455 0.0026* 0.1780 0.0066* 0.0219* 0.4631 0.0208* 0.0423*
Table 6: Pairwise and joint causality test p-values. The null hypotheses (H0)
were as follows: correlation (C) did not cause (in the Granger sense) financial
press pessimism (B) (C 9 B, left panel), financial press did not cause correlation
(B 9 C, right panel). ”All‘ indicates all variables are included in the test and
”*‘ indicates the null is rejected at the 5% significance level.
published in the newspapers’ banner headlines could influence market volatility.
More specifically, we found that Wall Street Journal alone contributed to market
volatility. At the same time, our findings also corroborated our second hypothesis
(H2), which argued that bad news could even influence the correlation of
markets. More specifically, we found that Wall Street Journal had a significant
impact on market correlation, although in different directions. Our third
hypothesis suggested that in period of financial turmoil it was likely that press
and markets co-influenced each other, possibly contributing to a cascade of
pessimism. We found that market correlation and newspapers influenced each
other but only in specific cases. In particular, results showed that Wall Street
Journal, the leading financial newspaper worldwide, had strong predictive value
for market correlation and volatility. These results would confirm that in periods
of financial turmoil, complex co-determination processes involving markets and
media might come into play. On the other hand, especially if we look at the
stronger influence of Wall Street Journal, we can argue against the common
sense belief that newspapers would have over-exaggerated the dramatic events
of 2008/2009 by imposing a critical stance which contributed to a cascade and
contagion of pessimism, with dramatic consequences on markets.
6 Closing Remarks
In an interesting personal account on 2008/2009 events, Peter S. Goodman, now
executive business editor of the Huffington Post, past national correspondent for
the New Work Times, reported that:
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“Inside our newsroom in midtown Manhattan, we understood that were
were not merely passive chroniclers of external events. The sportswriter
can describe what is happening on the field from a dispassionate distance,
without imagining that the words he types may somehow influence the
events he is witnessing. Not so for those of us writing about the financial
crisis: were were effectively on the field while the game was still under way.
Investors and markets and ordinary people would move their money in
reaction to what we and other major media were reporting, and this would
in turn affect the policy climate, the perception of need for emergency
measures, the politics of the debate over those measures, and the public
mood, which then reverberated back on everything else“ (Goodman (2011),
p. 110).
This personal view seems to be reflected in our findings, especially in case
of Wall Street Journal. Indeed, our results confirmed that press and markets
are linked in complex ways and indicate that, in times of financial turmoil,
their relationship is probably even tighter than in periods of business as usual.
Following Goodman’s report, this reminds us that a competent, reliable and
responsible information is crucial for a well functioning of markets. More serious
investigation on the ethics and responsibility of financial press to establish new
standards of conducts and better incentives and sanctions to support reliable
information, would be needed (e.g., Tambini (2010)).
Secondly, our findings showed that the increasing globalization of financial
markets and their correlation in times of crisis require the capability of the press
to truly cover the international dimension of business and be less parochial. This
challenges the actual quality of the press coverage of global market dynamics
and indicates the need for improving the public understanding of the intricate
mechanisms of stock markets.
Finally, it is worth clarifying that our work shows certain limitations. First,
we did not study the influence of financial press on stock markets but only that
of bad news. This gave us a narrow view of the link of press and markets.
Secondly, we studied the relationship of financial press and stock markets in
an “abnormal“ market phase, where market behaviour is strongly subjected to
irrational expectation and social mood. We intentionally selected this period
as we expected that, in these situations, the pessimism of the financial press
dramatically enters the picture and shows interesting dynamics. On the other
hand, it is realistic that in ”normal‘ market periods pessimism plays a minor role.
Therefore, while our results cannot contribute to formulate a general theory of
the link of press and markets, they can provide important clues to understand
the ’social construction’ of pessimism between press and markets. Among the
limitations, it is important to note that press pessimism and market behaviour
could be also conditioned by other media, such as the new social media and
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the Internet (see the recent study on Twitter by Bollen et al. (2011)). Further
investigation is needed to compare behaviour and impact of various media and
provide a more precise analysis of the 2008/2009 crisis (e.g., see Preis et al.
(2010)).
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